しないに越したことはない : 超義務と亜義務の倫理学

This article discusses the normative features of supererogation, i.e., desirable but nonobligatory acts, and suberogation, i.e., undesirable but unprohibited acts. First, we elaborate on the so-called “paradox” of supererogation by disentangling the premises that constitute this normative-ethical problem. Subsequently, we examine two existing arguments to dissolve this paradox and demonstrate how both lines fail to capture our understanding of supererogatory acts. Next, we submit that “supererogation” is not a monolithic notion as is often assumed but is made of two subclasses: benevolent supererogation, typically including small favor or donation, and heroic supererogation, whose textbook cases include self-sacrificing lifesaving. After showing how the two subclasses differ in their nature and morality, we suggest that benevolent supererogation is not morally required because its marginal moral value is negligible and that, in contrast, heroic supererogation is not morally required because, given that it is outside the choice of ordinary people, it lacks deontic status itself. Finally, we expand these insights on supererogation to the morality of suberogation, an underexplored theoretical cousin of supererogation. We lay out two subclasses of suberogation: delinquent suberogation, which denotes minor moral badness unworthy of prohibition, and atrocious suberogation, whose paradigmatic cases are extremely evil acts such as genocide. Having this distinction in mind, we argue that delinquent suberogation is not morally forbidden because its surplus moral disvalue is negligible and that, in contrast, atrocious suberogation is not morally forbidden because, given that it is outside the choice of ordinary people, it lacks deontic status itself.