The reorganization of Japan's Demobilization Board after the Asia-Pacific War

Although the reorganization of Japan’s Demobilization Board (Fukuin-Cho 復員庁) should essentially be discussed in relation to its operations, the research to date has chosen to focus on the relationship between former military commanders working at the Board’s Office of Historical Research and Major-General Charles A. Willoughby, chief of Intelligence G2 of the General Head-quarters Supreme Commanders for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP), in arguing that the main intent of reorganization was the rearmament of Japan. The present article questions whether such an approach is appropriate with a reexamination of the issues involved, concluding that Board reorganization was not an effort to improve demobilization operations, but rather given impetus by growing conflict between the US and Soviet Union, dissension among the GHQ bureaus and misunderstanding between the US and Japan. <br> Demobilization seems to have been the true intent when the Board was first set up, since talks between the US and Soviet Union could have led to a smooth deactivation of the last Japanese veterans remaining in Soviet territory, thus making it possible to decide the Board's operational scale. Instead, in the US-Soviet discussions, the Soviet Union demanded that the Board be reduced in size and that the Japanese veterans simply be driven out of the territory, to which the US disagreed, thus bringing about a political stalemate. In addition, while absolutely allowing the exile of veterans in Demobilization Board, the US insisted on the legitimacy of them remaining in Demobilization Board. Disagreement arose within GHQ between the Government Section (GS), which staunchly opposed exile and the G2, which was more complaisant. <br> A gap in perceptions held by the US and Japan regarding demobilization operations greatly affected the Board’s work. In contrast to GHQ’s understanding that demobilization involved the completion of discharge procedures and evacuation of those processed, the Japan demanded the continuation of operations in order to search for veterans missing in action. The Japan demands were not accepted, as Board reorganization steadily progressed in the midst of strong and insistent pleas from the Japan that operations continue. <br> The above situation is indicative of the lack of agreement between Japan and GHQ about how the reorganization of the Demobilization Board should proceed. GHQ was not only at odds with Japan and the Soviet Union, but also experienced both conflict and compromise internally between its own GS and G2 bureaus. Within Japanese politics, as well, the direction that reorganization should take lacked initiative even in the government's position on the matter. Consequently, the discussion over reorganization was infected by the political interests of various forces, thus preventing any reflection on the actual conditions surrounding demobilization. This is why the tendency to emphasize Demobilization Board reorganization as a move towards the rearmament of Japan should be reconsidered.