The Significance of Self-Reporting in Motivation
-
- Suzuki Takanori
- Waseda Graduate School of Accountancy
Bibliographic Information
- Other Title
-
- 動機付けにおける自己申告の意義
- ドウキズケ ニ オケル ジコ シンコク ノ イギ
Search this article
Description
<p>In the article, I have tried to find out significance of forcing an agent to self-report his actual effort level to a principal in motivation context. I built a principal-agent model in which they select their actions simultaneously. The major findings are as follows. 1.When the principal introduce self-reporting procedure, she can attain higher expected utility. 2.If she hopes to use self-reporting as a device to motivate the agent, she would be required to have a certain level of inspection technology. 3.As opposed to the non self-reporting case, the principal can be released from inspection resource constraint. 4.Therefore she can reduce inspection cost by minimizing frequency of the inspection. As a result, she is expected to gain higher utility. 5.Even though she can not expect a high level utility without setting severe penalty (payment from the agent to her) in the non self-reporting settings, she can attain the high expected utility with more tolerant penalty (positive payment to the agent) by adopting the self-reporting procedure.</p>
Journal
-
- The Journal of Management Accounting, Japan
-
The Journal of Management Accounting, Japan 15 (2), 57-76, 2007-03-30
The Japanese Association of Management Accounting
- Tweet
Keywords
Details 詳細情報について
-
- CRID
- 1390845713073720064
-
- NII Article ID
- 110007629509
-
- NII Book ID
- AN10538994
-
- ISSN
- 24340529
- 09187863
-
- NDL BIB ID
- 8836200
-
- Text Lang
- ja
-
- Data Source
-
- JaLC
- NDL
- NDL-Digital
- CiNii Articles
-
- Abstract License Flag
- Disallowed