The Relationship between an Increase in Individual Ownership and a Decline in Discipline on Corporate Management; Measured by Voting Outcome

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  • 個人株主の増加と議決権の不行使にみる 規律付けの低下の関係に関する実証研究
  • コジン カブヌシ ノ ゾウカ ト ギケツケン ノ フコウシ ニ ミル キリツ ズケ ノ テイカ ノ カンケイ ニ カンスル ジッショウ ケンキュウ

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This paper investigates whether an increase in individual ownership lowers a discipline on corporate management. To measure the discipline by shareholders, we use the voting outcome at director elections and the rate of voting rights which “DoNotVote”. From the empirical analysis, the more ownership individual investors hold, the less voting rights exercise. Individual investors are likely to have less incentive to discipline corporate management because their investment amount is small. This result suggests that an increase in individual ownership lowers discipline on corporate management.

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