書誌事項
- タイトル別名
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- The Authority of ‘the Thinking I’ : The Problem of Self-Knowledge and Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness
- 「 シコウ スル ワタクシ 」 ノ ケンイ : カント ノ ジコ イシキロン オ テガカリ ニ シテ
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説明
What explains the presumption that a speaker is not mistaken when he attributes a belief, hope, desire, or intention to his present self, while no such presumption is appropriate when others make similar attributions to him? Davidson's explanation of this first person authority traces the source of the authority to a necessary feature of the interpretation of speech. However at the same time a speaker must interpret himself on condition that he is aware that he thinks X, which Kant called ‘the transcendental unity of selfconsciousness’. Kant's theory of self-consciousness explains that none of the three sorts of knowledge, namely, knowledge of the objective world, knowledge of the minds of others, knowledge of the contents of my own mind, is reducible to either of the other two, or to any other two incombination.
収録刊行物
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- 法政哲学
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法政哲学 13 1-11, 2017-03-20
法政哲学会
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390853649757071104
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- NII論文ID
- 120006309704
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- NII書誌ID
- AA12104417
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- HANDLE
- 10114/13291
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- NDL書誌ID
- 028314513
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- ISSN
- 13498088
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- 本文言語コード
- ja
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- データソース種別
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- JaLC
- IRDB
- NDL
- CiNii Articles
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- 抄録ライセンスフラグ
- 使用可