Random Allocation in the Local Commons Management

DOI IR Web Site Open Access

Search this article

Abstract

When the word "tragedy of the commons" gained prominence as a warning against inevitable environmental destruction of common pool resources, the proposed solution was to abandon the commons. Its economic interpretation was either government regulation or privatization. Subsequent anthropological and sociological studies, however, found that many local communities have successfully avoided the "tragedy of the commons" with traditional institutions that emerge spontaneously among themselves. In these local communities, common pool resources are often divided in small units, and randomly distributed across community groups with such mechanisms as lottery and draw. This paper presents a simple two-period model that identifies the condition under which the random process generates incentives for voluntary environment protection. A somewhat counter-intuitive implication of the model is that random allocation facilitates conservation when environmental neglect leads to substantial degradation. It is also observed that the number of groups within the community should remain small in order for the random allocation rule to be an effective protection mechanism.

Journal

Keywords

Details 詳細情報について

Report a problem

Back to top