An Institutional Design for Proportional Representation with a Limited Majority Bonus

DOI HANDLE Web Site オープンアクセス

この論文をさがす

説明

The purpose of this article is to provide an institutional design for proportional representation with a limited majority bonus (PR-LMB), which I have proposed and defended in two of my earlier articles (Okazaki 2019a; Okazaki 2021). Japanese proponents of PR have generally argued for open-list PR with prefectural or regional constituencies or mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems, which are alleged to enable voters to choose a candidate on a list or in a constituency. Applied to the PR-LMB, these electoral systems make it difficult for voters to substantially choose a candidate. In addition, they make it difficult for parties to organize a well-balanced and well-communicated team. To avoid these serious problems, I propose a complex closed-list system with a nationwide constituency, in which lists are divided along policy lines. Furthermore, I propose an inversely proportional distribution of party subsidies for making the complex closed-list system work: 45 percent of the subsidies are distributed to the governing coalition or party, and 55 percent are distributed to opposition parties.

収録刊行物

  • 政治研究

    政治研究 69 124-98, 2022-03-31

    九州大学法学部政治研究室

関連プロジェクト

もっと見る

詳細情報 詳細情報について

問題の指摘

ページトップへ