An Institutional Design for Proportional Representation with a Limited Majority Bonus
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- 岡﨑 晴輝
- 九州大学大学院法学研究院 : 教授
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説明
The purpose of this article is to provide an institutional design for proportional representation with a limited majority bonus (PR-LMB), which I have proposed and defended in two of my earlier articles (Okazaki 2019a; Okazaki 2021). Japanese proponents of PR have generally argued for open-list PR with prefectural or regional constituencies or mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems, which are alleged to enable voters to choose a candidate on a list or in a constituency. Applied to the PR-LMB, these electoral systems make it difficult for voters to substantially choose a candidate. In addition, they make it difficult for parties to organize a well-balanced and well-communicated team. To avoid these serious problems, I propose a complex closed-list system with a nationwide constituency, in which lists are divided along policy lines. Furthermore, I propose an inversely proportional distribution of party subsidies for making the complex closed-list system work: 45 percent of the subsidies are distributed to the governing coalition or party, and 55 percent are distributed to opposition parties.
収録刊行物
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- 政治研究
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政治研究 69 124-98, 2022-03-31
九州大学法学部政治研究室
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390854882595037696
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- NII書誌ID
- AN00127337
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- DOI
- 10.15017/4774189
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- HANDLE
- 2324/4774189
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- NDL書誌ID
- 032098780
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- ISSN
- 02898357
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- 本文言語コード
- en
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- データソース種別
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- JaLC
- IRDB
- NDL
- KAKEN
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- 抄録ライセンスフラグ
- 使用可