Modes (modi) in Thomas Aquinas (Part II) Ethical Aspects of Modes

As the second part of my study on “modes” (modi) in Thomas Aquinas, this article investigates ethical aspects of “modes” in various texts of his. First, we examine the texts in which Aquinas treats the “mode of a virtue” (modus virtutis) and consider what it is. The term often connotes the mean of the virtue. In order to understand the varieties of the mode or the mean of the virtue, we explain how moral, intellectual, and theological virtues are in the middle. Unlike ethical and intellectual virtues, theological virtues are not essentially in the middle, and the term “mode of a virtue” designates more broadly the way in which a genuine virtue is exercised. We also consider how this “mode of a virtue” is related to the “mode of reason” (modus rationis) and the “mode of nature” (modus naturae) in the case of moral virtues. Thus, Aquinas uses the term to explicate the nature of virtues. He also employs it in order to classify various virtues into potential parts of the cardinal virtues and to explain how we praise virtues and name them. Second, we scrutinise Aquinas’s interpretation of “modes of courage” (modi fortitudinis), false virtues that appear to be the virtue of courage but are not truly. Through the analysis, we come to understand the difference between the “mode of a virtue” per se and the “mode of a virtue” per accidens. Third, we look at different types of “mode of an action” (modus actionis/agendi) and reach the depth of the equivocity of “mode” in Aquinas’s writings. Aquinas uses the term “mode of an action” in different senses. The term sometimes signifies an action itself: for instance, the mode of the action proper to God is to give being (esse). In many cases, however, the term signifies an attribute of an action. In some cases, it designates “a way, ” i.e., “a circumstance” (circumstantia) of an action distinguished from the other circumstances of an action: for instance, “rapidly” and “slowly” are modes of the action “walking.” In some cases, it signifies a consequence of all the circumstances of an action: (being done in) a good or bad manner is a mode of an action of this type. In other cases, it signifies a consequence of the action: for instance, “delightfully” or “sadly” is a mode of an action consequent upon the action. Throughout our investigation, we observe “modes” in ethical aspects have much in common with those in ontological aspects. The term “mode” means “a limit” and more broadly “a way” in ethical contexts as well. The “mode of a virtue” consists in the determination or commensuration of material and efficient principles of a virtuous action. In fact, we discover more commensurations or proportions in the mode of a virtue than in the mode of a natural kind, and this could explain why we find virtuous actions more beautiful than natural kinds.