Foreign propaganda by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in Taisho era

In the research to date on the history of modern Japanese foreign relations, the function of foreign propaganda by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan（MOFA）as a response to the “new diplomacy” has yet to be fully revealed. This article is an attempt to highlight this aspect by tracing the way in which MOFA conducted foreign propaganda from World War I up through the Washington Naval Conference.<br> The author begins with MOFA’s propaganda directed at China during WWI, describing how the Toho News Agency（Toho Tsushin-sha 東方通信社）, established by the Japanese consulate in Shanghai, first built its propaganda base by capitalizing on the anti-imperialist movement. Howerer, its activities in mainly Chinese language newspapers were condemned after the War because they were linked to Japanese involvement in China’s domestic affairs.<br> Then turning to after the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, the author describes how MOFA reexamined propaganda approaches to convince the United States that Japan’s policy towards China was fair and impartial and to counter anti-Japanese publicity in China, which MOFA thought as source of international “misunderstanding” toward Japan’s true intentions. It was in April 1920 that MOFA set up its Department of Information which directly supervised Toho News Agency and promoted English language newspapers to offer alternative opinions vis-a-vis US-owned papers published in China. Meanwhile, in the United States, there was still strong antipathy toward German wartime propaganda, Japanese diplomats in support of Prime Minister Hara Takashi’s foreign policy, including Hanihara Masanao and Shidehara Kijuro, rejected an approach to set up a bureau of propaganda there. Such contrasting propaganda styles towards China and the US were continued during the Washington Naval Conference.<br> Finally, the author takes up the Conference itself, focusing on the Department of Information, Toho News Agency and the Japanese plenipotentiary. Japan’s general intent was to recover international trust toward Japan. The Department’s First Division provided the plenipotentiary with reports from Toho News Agency on the situation in China. In addition, Toho News Agency’s special Washington correspondents reported back to the China office on the Conference proceedings, which Toho’s Reseach Division published in a special magazine. At the same time, the Department’s Second Division coordinated press conferences between Japanese officials and members of the international press in Tokyo, while in Washington, the plenipotentiary members met intimately with members of the press to show Japan’s positive attitude toward the open, transparent nature of the Conference, despite the belatedness of communications from Tokyo.<br> The author concludes that throughout the period in question, MOFA succeeded to some extent in moderating anti-Japanese press in China, while reconstructing the “old diplomatic” image of Japan held in the United States, by expanding the functions of Toho News Agency in the former, while providing the kind of fair and impartial information expected in the latter.