Collective Self-Defense and the Security Dilemma

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  • 集団的自衛権と安全保障のジレンマ
  • シュウダンテキ ジエイケン ト アンゼン ホショウ ノ ジレンマ

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<p>Lifting the ban on collective self-defense (CSD) allows Japan to provide military assistance in the event of armed attacks against its allies. The departure from the post-war defense strategy may inadvertently impact the security environment facing Japan. I analyze a game-theoretic model, in which Japan engages in peacetime diplomacy with a potential challenger in the first stage and, if a crisis arises between the U.S. and the challenger in the second stage, Japan must decide whether to intervene in a military conflict on the behalf of the U.S. The equilibrium shows that allowing for CSD decreases the risk that the challenger initiates a crisis, while it incentives Japan not to cooperate during peacetime, exacerbating the security dilemma, and the challenger to cooperate, ameliorating the dilemma. Key is that the shadow of a future crisis turns the peacetime cooperation problem into an opportunity for Japan to signal its resolve to intervene.</p>

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