The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms : An experiment for the Vickrey auction
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Description
We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness to subjects. Although the rate of truth-telling among the subjects stays at 20% without the announcement, it increases to 47% with the announcement. Moreover, by conducting experiments for the pay-your-bid auction, which is not strategy-proof, with and without advice, we find that our experimental results are not attributed to so-called experimenter demand effects. Strategy-proof mechanisms are sometimes criticized because players often fail to find the benefit of truth-telling, but our observations tell that introducing an educative announcement helps them behave "correctly".
Journal
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- ISER discussion paper
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ISER discussion paper (1109), 1-32, 2020-12
Toyonaka : Institute of Social and Economic Research
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Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1521699231105895552
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- NII Article ID
- 40022512466
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- ISSN
- 0473453X
- 15565068
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- HANDLE
- 10419/230455
- 11094/72992
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- NDL BIB ID
- 031336785
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- Text Lang
- en
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- NDL Source Classification
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- ZD11(経済--経済学)
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- Data Source
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- NDL Search
- Crossref
- CiNii Articles
- KAKEN
- OpenAIRE