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説明
This paper uses laboratory experiments to study subjects' assessment of uncertainty resulting from strategic and non-strategic decisions of other players. Non-strategic events are defined by the colors of balls drawn from urns, whereas strategic events are defined by the action choice in Stag Hunt (SH) and Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) games. We elicit subjects' matching probabilities and examine if they satisfy the law of probability including monotonicity and additivity. Violations from the law are observed for both uncertainty sources, but are more substantial for strategic uncertainty. In particular, we observe a coordination fallacy, a violation of monotonicity whereby the probability weight placed on a symmetric coordination profile of the games exceeds that placed on the corresponding action choice. The violation is found to be severer for an efficient coordination profile.
収録刊行物
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- ISER discussion paper
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ISER discussion paper (1117), 1枚,1-43, 2021-02
Toyonaka : Institute of Social and Economic Research
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1523106605989522688
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- NII論文ID
- 40022516160
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- ISSN
- 0473453X
- 15565068
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- HANDLE
- 10419/234929
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- NDL書誌ID
- 031338312
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- 本文言語コード
- en
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- 資料種別
- journal article
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- NDL 雑誌分類
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- ZD11(経済--経済学)
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- データソース種別
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- NDLサーチ
- Crossref
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