情報開示の強制と企業のインセンティヴ

Bibliographic Information

Other Title
  • MANDATORY DISCLOSURE AND MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES

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Description

This paper examines the economic role of mandatory disclosure in a noisy rational expectations model. Many theoretical studies of discretionary disclosure suggest that firms never have the incentive to spend less on disclosure than is socially optimal and offer no support for mandatory disclosure regulations.<br>This paper, however, derives the paradoxical result that mandatory disclosure may increase the social surplus even when firms have the incentive to spend more on disclosure than is socially optimal. The reason is that mandatory disclosure may increase the cost of disclosing too much information and discourage firms from making this overdisclosure decision.

Journal

Details 詳細情報について

  • CRID
    1570009751890572800
  • NII Article ID
    110000372356
  • NII Book ID
    AN00266049
  • ISSN
    0557109X
  • Text Lang
    en
  • Data Source
    • CiNii Articles

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