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A Study on Higher Order Differential Attack of Camellia

  • KAWABATA Takeshi
    the Department of Electrical Engineering, Faculty of Science and Technology, Tokyo University of Science
  • TAKEDA Masaki
    the Department of Electrical Engineering, Faculty of Science and Technology, Tokyo University of Science
  • KANEKO Toshinobu
    the Department of Electrical Engineering, Faculty of Science and Technology, Tokyo University of Science

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Abstract

The encryption algorithm Camellia is a 128 bit block cipher proposed by NTT and Mitsubishi, Japan. Since the algebraic degree of the outputs after 3 rounds is greater than 128, designers estimate that it is impossible to attack Camellia by higher order differential. In this paper, we show a new higher order differential attack which controls the value of differential using proper fixed value of plaintext. As the result, we found that 6-round F-function can be attacked using 8th order differentials. The attack requires 2^17 chosen plaintexts and 2^22 F-function operations. Our computer simulation took about 2 seconds for the attack. If we take 2-R elimination algorithm, 7-round F-function will be attacked using 8th order differentials. This attack requires 2^19 chosen plaintexts and 2^64 F-function operations, which is less than exhaustive search for 128 bit key.

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Details

  • CRID
    1571698602418367104
  • NII Article ID
    110003212477
  • NII Book ID
    AA10826239
  • ISSN
    09168508
  • Text Lang
    en
  • Data Source
    • CiNii Articles

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