A Study on Higher Order Differential Attack of Camellia
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- KAWABATA Takeshi
- the Department of Electrical Engineering, Faculty of Science and Technology, Tokyo University of Science
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- TAKEDA Masaki
- the Department of Electrical Engineering, Faculty of Science and Technology, Tokyo University of Science
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- KANEKO Toshinobu
- the Department of Electrical Engineering, Faculty of Science and Technology, Tokyo University of Science
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Abstract
The encryption algorithm Camellia is a 128 bit block cipher proposed by NTT and Mitsubishi, Japan. Since the algebraic degree of the outputs after 3 rounds is greater than 128, designers estimate that it is impossible to attack Camellia by higher order differential. In this paper, we show a new higher order differential attack which controls the value of differential using proper fixed value of plaintext. As the result, we found that 6-round F-function can be attacked using 8th order differentials. The attack requires 2^17 chosen plaintexts and 2^22 F-function operations. Our computer simulation took about 2 seconds for the attack. If we take 2-R elimination algorithm, 7-round F-function will be attacked using 8th order differentials. This attack requires 2^19 chosen plaintexts and 2^64 F-function operations, which is less than exhaustive search for 128 bit key.
Journal
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- IEICE transactions on fundamentals of electronics, communications and computer sciences
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IEICE transactions on fundamentals of electronics, communications and computer sciences 86 (1), 31-36, 2003-01-01
The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers
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Details
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- CRID
- 1571698602418367104
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- NII Article ID
- 110003212477
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- NII Book ID
- AA10826239
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- ISSN
- 09168508
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- Text Lang
- en
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- Data Source
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- CiNii Articles