日本教職員組合は73春闘半日ストをどう闘ったか : 70年代序盤における日教組の政治的機会構造

This paper clarifies the process and the result of the "Half-Day Strike" for 1973 Shunto by the JTU. The authors examine not only the internal process of the JTU but also the external one such as Komuin-kyoto and Sohyo, by using the theory of Political Opportunity Structure (Tarrow, 1996). Becauseits strike, collective action, was formed through the position of the JTU in the labor, where were many other unions, this paper looks into the wider political process. In other words, it employs the multi-dimensional scheme, not the scheme of the LDP & Ministry of Education versus Education Movement. Four main findings are below: １) the administrative punishment to "1969.11.13 strike" changed the financeof the JTU fundamentally to cause the steep raising of relief and struggle fees, but the finance was not problematic among the left and right mainstreams and the anti-mainstream before "1974.4.11 oppression." TheJTU could not help going on strike because it was beyond calculation whether the JTU would lose or win and because stopping its strike meant they were illegal and lose cases. ２) because the JTU was the most powerful and leading union in Komuinkyoto,it was required to strike with the other public sector unions against 100 the restructuring of the labor side led by right-wing private sector unions. In addition, since the right to strike was inseparable to dealing with the administrative punishment and since these problems were unlikely to besolved through Jinji-in and Koseishin, the public sector unions thought that the only way was to go on strike. ３) the position of the JTU in Sohyo was relatively low because they were weak in strike and because they failed to make its requests accepted bySohyo for the negotiation with the government. Furthermore, the Ministry of Education ignored "the Seven Agreements" and never stopped punishing the JTU. Also, the fact that the requests of teachers union were difficult for other unions to understand lowered the positon of the JTU as for 1973 Shunto in Sohyo. ４) the JTU managed to obtain cooperation of the Director of the Primary and Secondary Education Bureau through the informal route mediated by the Nisseiren congressmen. However, the influence was limited because of prowar attitudes of the LPD hawkish and some prefecture unions of the JTU. In summary, some of the causes of "Half-Day Strike" for 1973 Shunto of the JTU are "increases in institutional access", "influential ally", and "change instate capacity for repression," all of which are situational (Tarrow, 1996). Now that Sohyo, influential ally, intended a much larger strike to win the basic legal rights to labor in 1974 Shunto, the JTU could not but go on "All-Day Strike." The authors think that some atmosphere for reconciliationbetween the JTU and the Ministry of Education might vanish by this attitude.