Plaintext Simulatability

この論文をさがす

説明

We propose a new security class, called plaintext simulatability, defined over the public-key encryption schemes. The notion of plaintext simulatability (denoted PS) is similar to the notion of plaintext awareness (denoted PA) defined in [3], but it is "properly" a weaker security class for public-key encryption. It is known that PA implies the class of CCA2-secure encryption (denoted IND-CCA2) but not vice versa. In most cases, PA is "unnecessarily" strong--In such cases, PA is only used to study that the public-key encryption scheme involved meets IND-CCA2, because it looks much easier to treat the membership of PA than to do "directly" the membership of IND-CCA2. We show that PS also implies IND-CCA2, while preserving such a technical advantage as well as PA. We present two novel CCA2-secure public-key encryption schemes, which should have been provided with more complicated security analyses. One is a random-oracle version of Dolev-Dwork-Naor's encryption scheme [8], [9]. Unlike the original scheme, this construction is efficient. The other is a public-key encryption scheme based on a strong pseudo-random permutation family [16] which provides the optimal ciphertext lengths for verifying the validity of ciphertexts, i.e., (ciphertext size)=(message size)+(randomness size). According to [19], such a construction remains open. Both schemes meet PS but not PA.

収録刊行物

被引用文献 (2)*注記

もっと見る

参考文献 (24)*注記

もっと見る

詳細情報 詳細情報について

  • CRID
    1572543027339391872
  • NII論文ID
    110003486106
  • NII書誌ID
    AA10826239
  • ISSN
    09168508
  • 本文言語コード
    en
  • データソース種別
    • CiNii Articles

問題の指摘

ページトップへ