Two-automata games
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説明
Abstract It is an interesting point of view to consider automata games as a model of human behaviors in a society. Automata games have been proposed by Tsetlin and Krylov. In their model, however, the final expected value of winnings was not equal to the value of Von Neumann in the game theory. In this paper, we consider the two automata zero sum games between automata proposed by Fu and Li with two strategies, and show that if the game matrix G = [ g ij ] satisfies the condition then the final expected value of winnings is equal to the value of Von Neumann. Satisfactory results are obtained by computer simulations, as shown at the end of this paper.
収録刊行物
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- Information Sciences
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Information Sciences 7 81-93, 1974-01-01
Elsevier BV