Silent Large Shareholders and Entrenched Bank Management: Evidence from the Banking Crisis in Japan

DOI Open Access

Description

We investigate the cause of this banking crisis that has jeopardized the stability of the financial and economic system since the 1990s. Following Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2001), we argue that the deficiency of effective corporate governance of banks in Japan has caused inefficient management. Our focus here is the role of large st shareholders who happen to be banks and insurers. We argue that these large shareholders appear to collude or conspire with management instead of being tough monitors. Consequently, the management became entrenched. Our empirical results show that during the 1980s these 'entrenched banks' extended more lending. Even after the collapse of the bubble in the 1990s, they did not dramatically undertake restructuring to cope with the accumulated bad loans.

Journal

Keywords

Details 詳細情報について

Report a problem

Back to top