Strategic Central Bank Communication: Discourse and Game-Theoretic Analyses of the Bank of Japan's Monthly Report
説明
We conduct a discourse analysis of the Bank of Japan’s Monthly Report and examine its characteristics in relation to business cycles. We find that the difference between the number of positive and negative expressions in the reports leads the leading index of the economy by approximately three months, which suggests that the central bank’s reports have some superior information about the state of the economy. Moreover, ambiguous expressions tend to appear more frequently with negative expressions. Using a simple persuasion game, we argue that the use of ambiguity in communication by the central bank can be seen as strategic information revelation when the central bank has an incentive to bias the reports (and hence beliefs in the market) upwards.
収録刊行物
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- SSRN Electronic Journal
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SSRN Electronic Journal 2016-01-01
Elsevier BV