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- 小草 泰
- 大阪市立大学
書誌事項
- タイトル別名
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- What does the ‘Transparency of Experience’ Show about the Relationship between the Phenomenality and the Intentionality of Experience?
抄録
A pretty big debate has been going on in the recent philosophy of mind as to whether the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is exhausted by (or reduced to) its intentional content. On the one hand, Representationalists often argue on the ground of the so-called ‘transparency of experience’ that the phenomenal character of an experience is exhausted by its intentional content. On the other hand, qualia theorists object that there are non-intentional features of experiences (‘qualia’). But, in my view, the debate itself is wrong-headed in this respect: it presupposes that intentional contents of experiences can be explained without mentioning their phenomenal characters, but this presupposition is groundless. In this paper, I argue, by reconsidering the ‘transparency of experience’ thesis, that a more appropriate view on the relationship between intentional contents and phenomenal characters of experiences is a pretty much different one than that shared by both sides of the debate.
収録刊行物
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- 科学哲学
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科学哲学 44 (1), 17-33, 2011
日本科学哲学会
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390001205083828608
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- NII論文ID
- 130004546720
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- ISSN
- 18836461
- 02893428
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- 本文言語コード
- en
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- データソース種別
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- JaLC
- Crossref
- CiNii Articles
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- 抄録ライセンスフラグ
- 使用不可