「経験の透明性」は経験の現象性と志向性の関係について何を示しているのか

書誌事項

タイトル別名
  • What does the ‘Transparency of Experience’ Show about the Relationship between the Phenomenality and the Intentionality of Experience?

抄録

    A pretty big debate has been going on in the recent philosophy of mind as to whether the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is exhausted by (or reduced to) its intentional content. On the one hand, Representationalists often argue on the ground of the so-called ‘transparency of experience’ that the phenomenal character of an experience is exhausted by its intentional content. On the other hand, qualia theorists object that there are non-intentional features of experiences (‘qualia’). But, in my view, the debate itself is wrong-headed in this respect: it presupposes that intentional contents of experiences can be explained without mentioning their phenomenal characters, but this presupposition is groundless. In this paper, I argue, by reconsidering the ‘transparency of experience’ thesis, that a more appropriate view on the relationship between intentional contents and phenomenal characters of experiences is a pretty much different one than that shared by both sides of the debate.

収録刊行物

  • 科学哲学

    科学哲学 44 (1), 17-33, 2011

    日本科学哲学会

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詳細情報 詳細情報について

  • CRID
    1390001205083828608
  • NII論文ID
    130004546720
  • DOI
    10.4216/jpssj.44.1_17
  • ISSN
    18836461
    02893428
  • 本文言語コード
    en
  • データソース種別
    • JaLC
    • Crossref
    • CiNii Articles
  • 抄録ライセンスフラグ
    使用不可

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