書誌事項
- タイトル別名
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- Defending the Anti-casual Theory of Action Based on the Anti-psychologism of Reason
- リユウ ノ ハン シンリ シュギ ニ モトズイテ コウイ ノ ハン インガセツ オ ヨウゴ スル
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抄録
<p> The causal theory of action, which has been the standard theory of action, presupposes that reasons for action are an agentʼs mental attitudes (e.g. beliefs and desires) and claims that they are the cause of the action. However, in this paper I argue that reasons for action are not the agentʼs mental attitudes but their object (e.g. facts, states of affairs, or propositions), inspired by the idea that reasons must be capable of justifying the action as well as explaining it, and that what has this normative force is not mental items, but something objective. I also solve a problem that derives from cases in which the agent believes things falsely.</p>
収録刊行物
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- 科学哲学
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科学哲学 49 (1), 1-17, 2016
日本科学哲学会
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390001205085264640
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- NII論文ID
- 130005279432
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- NII書誌ID
- AN00037482
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- ISSN
- 18836461
- 02893428
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- NDL書誌ID
- 027635150
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- 本文言語コード
- en
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- データソース種別
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- JaLC
- NDL
- Crossref
- CiNii Articles
- KAKEN
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- 抄録ライセンスフラグ
- 使用不可