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This paper investigates the effects of social dumping in cases where firms strategically interact in the output market. Two firms (Northern and Southern) compete in the Northern market. The Southern firm practices social dumping by exploiting its monopsony power in the Southern labor market. Using the Cournot-Ikema curve, I diagrammatically demonstrate that social dumping by the Southern firm is actually beneficial to the Northern firm. However, Northern consumers suffer from social dumping. Imposing social clause tariffs gives a strategic advantage to the Southern firm. At the same time, it may improve Northern social welfare.<br> JEL Classification: F12, F13, J42, L13.
収録刊行物
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- Ｔｈｅ Ｉｎｔｅｒｎａｔｉｏｎａｌ Ｅｃｏｎｏｍｙ
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Ｔｈｅ Ｉｎｔｅｒｎａｔｉｏｎａｌ Ｅｃｏｎｏｍｙ 16 (0), 59-77, 2013
日本国際経済学会
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390001205411300864
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- NII論文ID
- 130004562639
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- NII書誌ID
- AA12436053
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- ISSN
- 18844367
- 21866074
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- NDL書誌ID
- 024929187
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- 本文言語コード
- en
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- データソース種別
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- JaLC
- NDL
- Crossref
- CiNii Articles
- KAKEN
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- 抄録ライセンスフラグ
- 使用不可