真理条件とは何か

福井 謙一

doi:10.4216/jpssj.37.29

Bibliographic Information

Other Title

シンリジョウケントワナニカ

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Description

The notion of truth conditions of sentences or psychological states plays important roles in various areas of philosophy, but authors who appeal to this notion rarely explain exactly what attribute of those entities truth conditions are. Indeed, there are two notions (not always clearly distinguished) that can legitimately be called the notions of truth conditions, and these are definable by reference to different semantical frameworks. It turns out that there is an important systematic relationship between the two notions, explicitly definable within Kaplan's theory of demonstratives, and this reveals that the two kinds of truth conditions are to be attributed to entities of different ontological types.

Journal

Kagaku tetsugaku

Kagaku tetsugaku 37 (1), 29-42, 2004

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan