美的性質と知覚的証明

書誌事項

タイトル別名
  • Aesthetic Properties and Perceptual Proof
  • ビテキ セイシツ ト チカクテキ ショウメイ

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抄録

    According to the Sibleyan account, descriptive aesthetic judgments are warranted by aesthetic perception. I defend this account by using a philosophical theory of perceptual experience, that is, Fregean intentionalism. I will then suggest an anti-realistic account of aesthetic properties, which claims that perceivable aesthetic properties are not realistic properties supervening on sets of non-aesthetic sensible properties (e.g. color, shape, etc.) of objects, but some kind of “modes of presentation” of such properties. Proving this argument, I demonstrate how the philosophy of perception can be useful for considering problems in aesthetics.

収録刊行物

  • 科学哲学

    科学哲学 47 (2), 87-103, 2014

    日本科学哲学会

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