Bayesianism, Ravens, and Evidential Relevance

DOI 参考文献19件
  • PENNOCK Robert T.
    Lyman Briggs School of Science and Department of Philosophy, Michigan State University

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Bayesian confirmation theorists have proposed a variety of solutions to Hempel's paradox of the ravens. I examine those of Suppes and Horwich and argue that they do not completely avoid counter-intuitive results about the relevance of data. The Bayesian explication of evidential relevance is also susceptible to the same relevance problems that infect Hypothetico-Deductivism. I explore a possible escape to the problem of old evidence, but conclude that it only leads to problems of the same sort-any datum can be relevant to any hypothesis in any circumstance. I argue that the Bayesian evidence relation is not sufficient or necessary to determine what counts as evidence. Such difficulties warrant pursuit of alternative explications of evidential relevance. I show how the raven's paradox may be avoided by bringing in causal considerations.

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詳細情報 詳細情報について

  • CRID
    1390282680248750208
  • NII論文ID
    110007033691
  • NII書誌ID
    AA00026247
  • DOI
    10.4288/jafpos1956.13.1
  • ISSN
    18841228
    04530691
  • MRID
    2183059
  • 本文言語コード
    en
  • データソース種別
    • JaLC
    • Crossref
    • CiNii Articles
  • 抄録ライセンスフラグ
    使用不可

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