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Optimal Deal Strategies under the Disclosure of the Contract History : The Behavioral Norm in the Society of Autonomous Agents
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- ITO Akira
- Communications Research Laboratory, Ministory of Posts and Telecommunications
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- YANO Hiroyuki
- Communications Research Laboratory, Ministory of Posts and Telecommunications
Bibliographic Information
- Other Title
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- 取引履歴公開下での最適取引戦略 : 自律的エージェント社会の行動規範
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Description
<p>The social sanction mechanism against unfair deals is investigated in a society of autonomous agents. The mechanism is realized by disclosing the contract histories of all the agents. To simulate the situation, each agent is made to engage in the deal equivalent to the "Prisoner's dilemma" problem repetitively, each time changing the other party of the deal. Optimal deal strategies are searched under the condition that the contract records will be disclosed and open to all the agents. Several deal algorithms are taken up, and their behaviors are investigated by matching them under various conditions. Based on the results, the condition for optimal deal strategies of the agents are discussed.</p>
Journal
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- Journal of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence
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Journal of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence 10 (2), 271-278, 1995-03-01
The Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence
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Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390285697602013056
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- NII Article ID
- 110002806697
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- NII Book ID
- AN10067140
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- ISSN
- 24358614
- 21882266
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- Text Lang
- ja
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- Data Source
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- JaLC
- CiNii Articles
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- Abstract License Flag
- Disallowed
