Analysis of manipulation on mechanisms for a one-dimensional facility location problem

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  • 一次元区間上の施設配置メカニズムの戦略的操作の考察

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<p>We consider manipulation on facility location mechanisms which do not satisfy strategyproofness.Specifically, we deal with two mechanisms called the midpoint mechanism and the Nash mechanism. In the midpoint mechanism, the location is determined as half of the sum of the minimum and maximum values among the reported values.In the Nash mechanism, the location of facility is determined as that maximizing the product of utilities of the agents.Agents can improve their utility by manipulation in those mechanisms. In this paper, we investigate how one agent can manipulate the location of a facility in those mechanisms.</p>

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