A Polynomial-time, Truthful, Individually Rational, and Budget Balanced Ridesharing Mechanism
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- IWASE Tatsuya
- Toyota Motor Europe NV/SA
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- STEIN Sebastian
- University of Southampton
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- GERDING Enrico H.
- University of Southampton
Bibliographic Information
- Other Title
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- 誘因両立性・個人合理性・予算制約を満たす多項式時間ライドシェアリングメカニズム
Abstract
<p>Ridesharing has great potential to improve transportation efficiency while reducing congestion and pollution. To realize this potential, mechanisms are needed that allocate vehicles optimally and provide the right incentives to riders. However, many existing approaches consider restricted settings (e.g., only one rider per vehicle or a common origin for all riders). Moreover, naive applications of standard approaches, such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves or greedy mechanisms, cannot achieve a polynomial-time, truthful, individually rational, and budget balanced mechanism. To address this, we formulate a general ridesharing problem and apply mechanism design to develop a novel mechanism that satisfies all four properties and whose social cost is within 8.6% of the optimal on average.</p>
Journal
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- Proceedings of the Annual Conference of JSAI
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Proceedings of the Annual Conference of JSAI JSAI2023 (0), 4D2GS1104-4D2GS1104, 2023
The Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence
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Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390578283198203648
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- ISSN
- 27587347
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- Text Lang
- ja
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- Data Source
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- JaLC
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- Abstract License Flag
- Disallowed