The Significance of Self-Reporting in Motivation

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  • 動機付けにおける自己申告の意義
  • ドウキズケ ニ オケル ジコ シンコク ノ イギ

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Abstract

<p>In the article, I have tried to find out significance of forcing an agent to self-report his actual effort level to a principal in motivation context. I built a principal-agent model in which they select their actions simultaneously. The major findings are as follows. 1.When the principal introduce self-reporting procedure, she can attain higher expected utility. 2.If she hopes to use self-reporting as a device to motivate the agent, she would be required to have a certain level of inspection technology. 3.As opposed to the non self-reporting case, the principal can be released from inspection resource constraint. 4.Therefore she can reduce inspection cost by minimizing frequency of the inspection. As a result, she is expected to gain higher utility. 5.Even though she can not expect a high level utility without setting severe penalty (payment from the agent to her) in the non self-reporting settings, she can attain the high expected utility with more tolerant penalty (positive payment to the agent) by adopting the self-reporting procedure.</p>

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